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IN IBE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF UTAH 
: The State of Utah 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 20034 
I 
i Donald Hansen 
i 
I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF TI-IE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed from a conviction of Assault 
I with a Deadly Weapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery upon 
I ju:i:y trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County. 
I DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict of guilty 
: tu the crime charged, the defendant appeals. 
I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of his conviction as a matter 
lof bw, or that failing, a new trial. 
2 
STATE~1ENT OF FACTS 
On October 23, 1966 at approximately 1:10 A.M., Appellant 
i;l1tc1ed a Salt Lake City tavern, Club 451, operated by one, 
G2orl_';e Rukavina. As he entered the front door, he was seen 
vy Mr. Rukavina to have had a pistol in his hand and was heard 
to say "don't move." R-5. Mr. Rukavina dropped to the floor 
and c::.·::nvled behind the bar to his office. In the meantime, a 
cJicencler employed by Mr. Rukavina, Mr. Joe Palanco, grabbed 
the appellant and wrestled him to the ground. R-5, 22. Mr. 
! Palcnco took the pistol away from the appellant and gave it to 
~,lr. Rukavina who in turn gave it to another employee, Mr. 
E\'Jl'isto Martinez. R-6 
During the scuffle, the appellant wrestled his way to the 
entrance and out into the street where he was ultimately sub-
dued by Mr. Palanco and Salt Lake Police Officer Christensen 
1·1lio had seen what he thought to be a fight and had stopped to 
in·:cst~gn.te. R-45. 
Later Mr. Rukavina found a clip containing seven live 
rnunds of ammunition on the floor in the area where the scuf-
fi mg had taken place. R -10. This clip proved to be of the 
r'-r:c used in appellant's pistol. The pistol itself contained no 
i 
3 
such clip when it was taken from appellant. R-45. On exam-
h1ation by the officer, the pistol was found not to have any shell 
L1 the chamber and due to the absence of the clip it was incap· 
ablo oI firing. 
Testimony was taken regarding the ease with which the 
clip could be released from the pistol. R-47. No testimony 
is found in the record of anyone seeing the appellant release 
tJ-ie clip, nor that the clip was ever in the pistol on the night 
in question. R-55. Further, there is no mention at all that 
i a round was ever in the firing position. 
On the day and night in question, appellant consumed 
' br:;c amounts of alcohol at various taverns in Salt Lake County 
L1 the company of William Sorensen. R-51-56. The appellant 
, accompanied Mr. and Mrs. Sorenson from their home in Granger 
! Via other taverns to the Market Inn where they had a business 
I 
I ~ppointment. R-71. 
. Mrs. Sorenson testified that appellant took the gun with 
hrn when he left the car to enter the Market Lounge because 
he wanted to sell it. She further testified that the appellant 
did try to sell it to two other patrons of the Market Inn. R-72. 
\Vi:ile Mr. and Mrs. Sorenson were conducting their business, 
4 
t.he appellant left the Market Inn. Mrs. Sorenson testified that 
slie thought he was going to lie down in the car. R-73. He 
apparently wandered some three doors up the street to Club 
bl where the incident in question took place. 
TI1e appellant testified that he had no recollection of leav-
ing tl1e Market Inn and only remembers being taken to the hospital 
to La ,·e a head wound sown up, which he had sustained in the 
scwfle. R-84. 
At trial, the appellant was asked on direct examination 
I 
i wh2tl:er he had an accident in 1957. R-78. An objection by 
I 
tiie prosecution to the materiality and closeness of relation 
1 w:i0 sust'.J.iI1ed by the trial judge. Appellant's proffer of proof 
indicated that the appellant was involved in an accident where 
he fell down the stairs and suffered a severe concussion and 
'1 clot on the brain. Further, that since the operation, the 
appelbnt had exhibited abnormal reactions tn liquor, in that 
he suffered blackouts and irrational conduct. R-95. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN UNLOADED AU1DMA TIC PIS1DL IS NOT A 
DEADLY WEAPON WITHIN TI-IE MEANING OF 
5 
OJ? SECTION 76-51-3 UTAH CODE Ai\JNOTATED, 
1953, WHEN SUCH PISTOL COULD INFLICT HARM 
O.NL Y IF A CLIP CONTAIN1NG LIVE AMMUNITION 
IS INSERTED INTO A PISTOL AND A SHELL INJECTED 
lN'lD 'TIIE FIRING CHAMBER BY WORKING IBE 
SLIDE. 
Tiie appellant submits that the trial court erred in re-
1 lucii.116 to give Defendant's Instruction r.;o. 4 which is a true 
stJtc:ment of the law as it applies to this case. The court 
; furL:1~r erred in giving Court's Instruction No. 13. 
Defendant's requested instruction number 4 provides as 
"You are instructed that before you can find the 
defendant guilty of the crime of Assault with a Deadly 
.. v eapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery, you must 
find beyond a reasonable that defendant did in fact 
use a deadly weapon. 
You are further instructed that an unloaded gun 
is not a deadly weapon. The State must provebepnd 
a reasonable doubt that the gun held by Don Hansen 
in this case was loaded at the time. If it is reason-
able to believe that the gun was not loaded, you should 
acquit the defendant." 
The final paragraph of the Court's Instruction No. 13 
6 
"A deadly weapon, as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a weapon which in the particular 
manner used is then and there capable of producing 
death or great bodily harm. A loaded gun capable of 
being fired, or a gun capable of being fired and which 
can then and there be immediately loaded within a 
~ matter of moments is a deadly weapon." 
I 
r 
r 
I 
The Defendant's Instruction No. 4 is a true statement of 
tl1e ln.w and the Court's Instruction No. 13, which was given, 
is not a lru2! statement; hence, it is misleading and prejudiced. 
TI1e general rule is that an unloaded gun, used only as a 
firearm and not as a bludgeon, is not a deadly weapon within 
ti~c contemplation of statutes punishing as aggravated assaults, 
assaults witl1 a deadly weapon. People v. Sylva, 143 Cal.62, 
76 Pac .814(1904); Price v. U. S., 156 Fed.950(1807); State v. -------- --- --
0odfrey, 170r. 300,llAm.St. Rep. 83,20Pac. 625(1889); 
Territory v. Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 Pac. 102(1912); 74 ALR 
1206 (Cases are collected and cited.) 
1:1e traditional definition of assault with a deadly weapon 
• is ns follows: 
) 
I "to constitute the crime of assault with a deadly ~· or dangerous weapon, there must be an unlawful attempt 
with a deadly weapon, deadly or dangerous as a matter 
of law, or capable of being used in a dangerous manner 
7 
to iru.1.ict bodily injury, coupled with the present 
_actual ability to do so. (Emphasis added) I 
Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 361 
' 720 (Anderson ed. 1957)." 
The California court has e.xtended the rule somewhat 
, ;.;i l:.olJing that an automatic pistol which has six shells in the 
clip but none in the firing chamber and which was in firing 
: 
order, but which could be readied by pulling a slide back and 
! 1llowing it to go forward again, constituted a deadly weapon 
\dJ1in t.lie meaning of the Penal Code. People ~Pearson, 
1)U C. A. 2d 811, 311 P. 2d 142(1957). In so holding the court 
fou~1cl tl1n.t t11e case fell wiu'1in the rule initially laid down in 
fcople v. Simpson, 134 C. A. 646, 25 P. 2d 142(1933). There-
111 the court held that a rifle containing live rounds in the maga-
?iPc and none in the firing chamber, but such live rounds 
co11ld be quickly injected into the chamber by merely cocking 
::i lever, was such a deadly weapon. The underlying rationale 
is that such firearm should not be considered unloaded when 
; t "instantly" could be transferred into such a loaded weapon 
i1y mere operation of a lever. The court reasoned that to hold 
cthcnvise would be to assert that a pistol with an automatic 
l\!Yolving cylinder filled with loaded cartridges does not con -
't·1lt!te a deadly weapon although mere pressure of a finger 
0 11 t;:c trigger releases a safety pin and adjusts a cartridge 
8 
i.n position to be discharged. 
In the instant case, the pistol could not be transferred 
"instantly" into a deadly weapon. A clip or magazine contain-
rn2 live ammunition had to be manually inserted into the 
llanJle of the weapon, the slide safety released, and the slide 
• pulled back by holding the pistol in one hand and pulling with 
the other, then releasing the slide which under power supplied 
i by a spring inserts a shell into the firing chamber and cocks 
tlic pistol. 
It is submitted that the present case does not fit within 
tLe ex ten tion of the general rule laid' down by the California 
, courts. Rather because of the added functions to be performed 
I 
, v;ith tl1is weapon before the weapon would be capable of causing 
harm or injury, this case must fall within the general rule 
1 LhJ.t an unloaded firearm is not a deadly weapon within the 
meaning of tl1e definition of fue crime of assault witl1 a deadly 
I 
, WcJpon. Further, a ruling that the weapon in this case was 
: S\11:h a deadly weapon would be to ignore the tradition~! definition 
'~'f t."ie crime, and in effect would be to rule fuat one may have 
1he present actual ability to inflict harm when the weapon with 
' Which he was alleged to have committed an assault had to be 
r 
~ 1o'.ldcd before any harm could be done with it. This is contrary 
I 
9 
r to the plain meaning of the defini lion of the crime and con -
' rrar y to the general rule that an unloaded firearm is not a 
deadly weapon. 
It might be argued by the State that there is little dif-
ference between the instant case and those giving rise to the 
, California decisions in that the operation to be performed 
~ before t11e weapon could be operative could be performed in 
I 
) a relalively short period of time. Thus the court's instruction 
I 
! no. 13 saying that a weapon v1hich can be loaded within a 
I 
' I n11ttcr of moments is a deadly weapon would fall within the !--------
California rule and would be a proper instruction. Yet, 
hew long is a moment? It should be noted that the California 
('n1irt held only that when an unloaded firearm could be in-
stantly transfonned into a loaded gun capable of doing great 
bodily harm could it be considered a deadly weapon. Under 
ll1e expanded rationale inherant in the court's instruction 
almost any modern firearm could be considered a deadly 
'VP;:ipon since almost any firearm can be loaded by manually 
inserting a live cartridge into the firing chamber within a 
1 -~natter of moments. Such a holding would completely oblit-
e1 ate the general rule that an unloaded firearm is not a 
' 
I 10 
f Jeadly weapon and would in effect do away with the require-
/ 
ment that there be the present actual ability to carry out the 
tlircat as a requisite element of the crime charged. 
POINT 11 
TI-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TD 
ALLOW TESTIMONY CONCERNING A PRIOR 
ACCIDENT \VHICH CAUSED BRAIN DAMAGE 
TO DEFENDANT. 
TI1e Utah court has held as a general rule that evidence 
f of any fact which rationally tends to prove any material issue 
! i:: .idmissible unless forbidden by some specific rule, and it 
~ :~Lo;;.lcl be received ii offered for an admissible purpose al-
' tho11Lh it would be inadmissible for some other purpose. State 
I v.:._ Neal, 123 Utah 93, 254 P. 2d 1053(1953); State v. Nemier, 
i06 Utah 307, 148 P. 2d 327(1944); State:!...:_ Scott, 111 Utah 9, 
l/j p. 2d 1016(1947). 
All of t..he above cited cases resulted when the particular 
rbfcndant challenged the admissibility of particular State's evi-
L1ence. TI1e above rule was used to justify admission of evidence 
for the State. There seems to be no logical reason why the 
r:~::-n.dant should not be allowed to envoke the same rule when 
I 11 
I 
/ presenting evidence in his own behalf. 
Ordinarily, intent is an essential element of a crime. 
Fe0plc '!_· Miller, 4 Utah 412, 11 Pac. 514(1886); People ~ 
Swas3y, 6 Utah 93, 21 Pac. 400(1889); I Wharton's, Criminal 
Law and Procedure § 60, 135 (Anderson ed. 1957). Depend-
in~ on the crime charged the accused must have at least 
i.n~:r:dcd to do the act which the legislature has deemed a 
,·rltne. 
The fact of intoxication does not in itself affect the 
1-a;iJcity of a person to commit a crime nor his legal res-
pon.sibility therefor. Hopt ~Utah, 104 U. S. 631; Hall, 
bto::ica.tion and Criminal Responsibility, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 
1015. However, when an element of the offense is a specific 
m2ntal state, and the fact that the defendant was intnxicated 
ae6:ites such a mental state, the defendant's intoxication is 
::i ri"fense. State v. Stenback t 78 Utah 350, 2 P. 2d 1050, 
') i\LR 878. 
Utah has codified this rule in Section 76-1-22 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 which provides as follows: 
Effect of intoxication. --No act committed by a person 
\Vhile in a state of voluntary intoxication is less cri.mhal 
12 
by reason of his having been in such a condition. 
But whenever the actual existance of any particular 
purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element 
to constitute any particular species or degree of 
· crime, the jury may take into consideration the 
fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time 
in determining the purpose, motive or intent with 
which he committed the act. 
In the instant case, the appellant was charged with 
assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to commit rob-
bery contrary to Section 76-51-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
TMs crime by its statutory terms requires that the accused 
ll:lve the specific intent to commit robbery. Thus, the crime 
charged is within the preview of the quoted statute on the effect 
0£ intoxication. 
At trial the defendant was asked on direct examination 
Whether he had an accident in 1957. The prosecutor objected 
to the question on the grounds of materiality and closeness of 
relation. The defendant's proffer of proof asserts that he fell 
r0wn stairs in 1957 suffering a severe concusion and a clot on 
the brain. Although an operation was performed to correct 
the damage, the defendant has suffered reoccuring physical 
problems including an abnormal reaction to liquor. This is 
13 
maaucsted by blackouts and irrational conduct. The trial 
' Jud;;-e sustained the objection. 
It is submitted that the instant case falls within the 
general rule requiring that evidence be admitted if it ration-
ally tends to prove any material issue. The defendant testi-
fied at trial that he could not remember anything from the 
tir11c he was in the Market Inn until he awoke in the police car 
on the way to tl1e hospital. Any experienced trial judge can 
recall time and time again, in the face of overwhelming evi-
d~nce, that the accused cannot remember what happened. 
Normally the credence of such statements is rightly viewed 
with skepticism. This case, however, is not the normal 
case. In this case, the defendant had suffered a physical 
injury to his brain which affected his reaction to liquor in 
: that he has a past history of blackouts and irrational con-
! duct. TI1is evidence lends credence to the defendant's testi-
rn011y relating to lack of memory. 
Surely a defendant should not be forclosed from present-
ing evidence that will give credence to an otherwise incredu-
lous claim because the trial judge is prone to disbelieve the 
rL:tim. This matter is properly a matter for the jury. The 
14 
trial judge asked during the defendant's proffer of proof what 
sort of irrational things were claimed to have been done by 
:tl1e defendant in the periods of blackout. R-96. On reply 
tliat he had gotten into fights, and further, that he had had 
.prnJ1lems with his wife, namely, that he had struck her thus 
!necessitating a divorce on her part, the court commented, 
. "I think half tl1e divorces I've heard involve that sort of con-
1 
1
duct between husband and wife?" Such a comment indicates 
I 
' 
1 
tl1at the court may have been predisposed as to evidence re-
latin2' to t.he defendant's claim. 
i 
One stated ground for objection by the prosecutor is that 
lthe l95 7 accident was "not closely enough related." It has 
reen held by most courts that an objection for remoteness 
'goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evi-
1 -
fdence and the question of exclusion of the evidence for remote-
' 
!ness is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge. 
~Dt~_v~ _E•.rans, 88 Ariz. 364, 356 P. 2d ll06(1960); State~ 
lLnold, 45 Wash. 2d 505 , 275 P. 2d 895(1954); State ~Koch, 
~-·-
,6J Wyo. 175, 189 P. 2d 162(1948); State~ Nelson, 362 P. 2d 
f21(.1961). Although the particular.ca.se was a civil case for 
~ssault and battery rather than cnmmal, the Utah court fol-
1 
15 
lowed the above stated rule in Evans v. Gainsford, 
1[22 Utah 156, 24 7 P. 2d 431 (1952). 
It is stated as a general rule in regard to exclusion 
ifor remoteness, 
"Remoteness is a matter of degree. Its 
essence is such a want of open and visible con-
nection between the evidentiary and principle 
facts that, all things considered, the former 
is not worthy or safe to be admitted in proof 
of the latter ••• To be admissible, evidence 
must not be so remote in time as to be im-
material." 22 C. J. S. § 638, 987. 
In the instant case, the accident happened in 1957. 
However, the defendant had suffered from the affects of the 
accident up until the time of the alleged crime. One of such 
affects was the abnormal reaction to the consumption of liquor. 
1 Although evidence of intoxication was admitted, evidence of this 
i 
I defendant's abnormal reaction was not. 
It has been argued that the proffered evidence is material 
·and as such should have been admitted. Under the general rule 
i that evidence is admissible which rationally tends to prove any 
material issue, the evidence should have been admitted even 
tt1ough it might have been inadmissible for another reason. How-
l 
lS 
Jcr, Ll1e remoteness rule is expressed in terms of the lack 
uf u-:..J.terialicy. An exclusion by tl1e trial jud.;e for n::rnote-
1 ::.:'J is also a determination foat the evicience is imm.aterial, 
i TL.'.1·e~(he, we rnust examine this latter possiliili17. 
I 
I '~ 1 r 1 r 'd d th 
I 
11 .. e c.;e1enc.ant s acc1 ent an e resultant physical 
,:;;;~crs on him when under the influence of alcohol are mat-
1 
! 1::."l ._,J ~~is defense u::der ~le crime chJ.rf;ed even t::oll.;h 
I ,;,.;; c1·._ c1--:2ut L;it:pencu in 195 7, some:: te11 yc;.ns earlier. Such 
,_,;:.;:.;.,,·0 :_,ccs LO L:c l.:ick of specific int2nt. If the defendant 
; :... .. _,_:..:j:s L:om auvcrsc effocts of 1..i1e 1957 accident, evi-
-~ c 1:;:::rcof s:10uld be admissible regardless of when the 
'··-·:~ .. t cccurrcd. Since t:l1e eilects 0£ the injury tends to 
' ·~ '."Jrci:..:J.tivc on ti'1e issue of s ccific intent, evidence of the 
I J.' i:.~~·nt sl:ould have been admissible under the general rule 
I I rcqL'iring the admission of any fact that rationally tends to 
\ :~''"-'2 ~H'-Y material issue. Tli.erefore, the sustaining of the 
CO~CLUSION 
'I~Je Appellant has not been accorded a full and fair 
ti I''., ;i.nd the issue raised on appeal afford a basis for re-
0 .~ failure of the trial judge to admit evidence favorable 
17 
to J.J C:clense and his refusal to instruct the jury as to the 
ltrne J.ncl correct law prejudiced the case of the Appellant. 
11112 \_;:;£e11dant is entitled to the relief sought on appeal. 
I 
I 
' 
Respecifully submitted, 
Galen Ross 
:MITSUNAGA AND ROSS 
731 Ea.st South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
